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 Abstract
 
    This document discusses the use of the Internet Control Message
    Protocol (ICMP) to perform a variety of attacks against the
    Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).  Additionally, this document
    describes a number of widely implemented modifications to TCP’s
    handling of ICMP error messages that help to mitigate these issues.
 
 Status of This Memo
 
    This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
    published for informational purposes.
 
    This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
    (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
    received public review and has been approved for publication by the
    Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
    approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
    Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 
    Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
    http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5927.
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 1.  Introduction
 
    ICMP [RFC0792] [RFC4443] is a fundamental part of the TCP/IP protocol
    suite, and is used mainly for reporting network error conditions.
    However, the current specifications do not recommend any kind of
    validation checks on the received ICMP error messages, thus allowing
    a variety of attacks against TCP [RFC0793] by means of ICMP, which
    include blind connection-reset, blind throughput-reduction, and blind
    performance-degrading attacks.  All of these attacks can be performed
    even when the attacker is off-path, without the need to sniff the
    packets that correspond to the attacked TCP connection.
 
    While the possible security implications of ICMP have been known in
    the research community for a long time, there has never been an
    official proposal on how to deal with these vulnerabilities.  In
    2005, a disclosure process was carried out by the UK’s National
    Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) (now CPNI,
    Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure), with the
    collaboration of other computer emergency response teams.  A large
    number of implementations were found vulnerable to either all or a
    subset of the attacks discussed in this document [NISCC][US-CERT].
    The affected systems ranged from TCP/IP implementations meant for
    desktop computers, to TCP/IP implementations meant for core Internet
    routers.
 
    It is clear that implementations should be more cautious when
    processing ICMP error messages, to eliminate or mitigate the use of
    ICMP to perform attacks against TCP [RFC4907].
 
    This document aims to raise awareness of the use of ICMP to perform a
    variety of attacks against TCP, and discusses several counter-
    measures that eliminate or minimize the impact of these attacks.
    Most of the these counter-measures can be implemented while still
    remaining compliant with the current specifications, as they simply
    describe reasons for not taking the advice provided in the
    specifications in terms of "SHOULDs", but still comply with the
    requirements stated as "MUSTs".
 
    We note that the counter-measures discussed in this document are not
    part of standard TCP behavior, and this document does not change that
    state of affairs.  The consensus of the TCPM WG (TCP Maintenance and
    Minor Extensions Working Group) was to document this widespread
    implementation of nonstandard TCP behavior but to not change the TCP
    standard.
 
    Section 2 provides background information on ICMP.  Section 3
    discusses the constraints in the general counter-measures that can be
    implemented against the attacks described in this document.
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    Section 4 describes several general validation checks that can be
    implemented to mitigate any ICMP-based attack.  Finally, Section 5,
    Section 6, and Section 7, discuss a variety of ICMP attacks that can
    be performed against TCP, and describe attack-specific counter-
    measures that eliminate or greatly mitigate their impact.
 
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
 
 2.  Background
 
 2.1.  The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
 
    The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is used in the Internet
    architecture mainly to perform the fault-isolation function, that is,
    the group of actions that hosts and routers take to determine that
    there is some network failure [RFC0816].
 
    When an intermediate router detects a network problem while trying to
    forward an IP packet, it will usually send an ICMP error message to
    the source system, to inform the source system of the network problem
    taking place.  In the same way, there are a number of scenarios in
    which an end-system may generate an ICMP error message if it finds a
    problem while processing a datagram.  The received ICMP errors are
    handed to the corresponding transport-protocol instance, which will
    usually perform a fault recovery function.
 
    It is important to note that ICMP error messages are transmitted
    unreliably and may be discarded due to data corruption, network
    congestion, or rate-limiting.  Thus, while they provide useful
    information, upper-layer protocols cannot depend on ICMP for correct
    operation.
 
    It should be noted that there are no timeliness requirements for ICMP
    error messages.  ICMP error messages could be delayed for various
    reasons, and at least in theory could be received with an arbitrarily
    long delay.  For example, there are no existing requirements that a
    router flush any queued ICMP error messages when it is rebooted.
 
 2.1.1.  ICMP for IP version 4 (ICMPv4)
 
    [RFC0792] specifies the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) to
    be used with the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) -- henceforth
    "ICMPv4".  It defines, among other things, a number of error messages
    that can be used by end-systems and intermediate systems to report
    errors to the sending system.  The Host Requirements RFC [RFC1122]
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    classifies ICMPv4 error messages into those that indicate "soft
    errors", and those that indicate "hard errors", thus roughly defining
    the semantics of them.
 
    The ICMPv4 specification [RFC0792] also defines the ICMPv4 Source
    Quench message (type 4, code 0), which is meant to provide a
    mechanism for flow control and congestion control.
 
    [RFC1191] defines a mechanism called "Path MTU Discovery" (PMTUD),
    which makes use of ICMPv4 error messages of type 3 (Destination
    Unreachable), code 4 (fragmentation needed and DF bit set) to allow
    systems to determine the MTU of an arbitrary internet path.
 
    Finally, [RFC4884] redefines selected ICMPv4 messages to include an
    extension structure and a length attribute, such that those ICMPv4
    messages can carry additional information by encoding that
    information in the extension structure.
 
    Appendix D of [RFC4301] provides information about which ICMPv4 error
    messages are produced by hosts, intermediate routers, or both.
 
 2.1.2.  ICMP for IP version 6 (ICMPv6)
 
    [RFC4443] specifies the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) to
    be used with the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [RFC2460].
 
    [RFC4443] defines the "Packet Too Big" (type 2, code 0) error
    message, which is analogous to the ICMPv4 "fragmentation needed and
    DF bit set" (type 3, code 4) error message.  [RFC1981] defines the
    Path MTU Discovery mechanism for IP version 6, which makes use of
    these messages to determine the MTU of an arbitrary internet path.
 
    Finally, [RFC4884] redefines selected ICMPv6 messages to include an
    extension structure and a length attribute, such that those ICMPv6
    messages can carry additional information by encoding that
    information in the extension structure.
 
    Appendix D of [RFC4301] provides information about which ICMPv6 error
    messages are produced by hosts, intermediate routers, or both.
 
 2.2.  Handling of ICMP Error Messages
 
    The Host Requirements RFC [RFC1122] states in Section 4.2.3.9 that
    TCP MUST act on an ICMP error message passed up from the IP layer,
    directing it to the connection that triggered the error.
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    In order to allow ICMP messages to be demultiplexed by the receiving
    system, part of the original packet that triggered the message is
    included in the payload of the ICMP error message.  Thus, the
    receiving system can use that information to match the ICMP error to
    the transport protocol instance that triggered it.
 
    Neither the Host Requirements RFC [RFC1122] nor the original TCP
    specification [RFC0793] recommends any validation checks on the
    received ICMP messages.  Thus, as long as the ICMP payload contains
    the information that identifies an existing communication instance,
    it will be processed by the corresponding transport-protocol
    instance, and the corresponding action will be performed.
 
    Therefore, in the case of TCP, an attacker could send a crafted ICMP
    error message to the attacked system, and, as long as he is able to
    guess the four-tuple (i.e., Source IP Address, Source TCP port,
    Destination IP Address, and Destination TCP port) that identifies the
    communication instance to be attacked, he will be able to use ICMP to
    perform a variety of attacks.
 
    Generally, the four-tuple required to perform these attacks is not
    known.  However, as discussed in [Watson] and [RFC4953], there are a
    number of scenarios (notably that of TCP connections established
    between two BGP routers [RFC4271]) in which an attacker may be able
    to know or guess the four-tuple that identifies a TCP connection.  In
    such a case, if we assume the attacker knows the two systems involved
    in the TCP connection to be attacked, both the client-side and the
    server-side IP addresses could be known or be within a reasonable
    number of possibilities.  Furthermore, as most Internet services use
    the so-called "well-known" ports, only the client port number might
    need to be guessed.  In such a scenario, an attacker would need to
    send, in principle, at most 65536 packets to perform any of the
    attacks described in this document.  These issues are exacerbated by
    the fact that most systems choose the port numbers they use for
    outgoing connections from a subset of the whole port number space,
    thus reducing the amount of work needed to successfully perform these
    attacks.
 
    The need to be more cautious when processing received ICMP error
    messages in order to mitigate or eliminate the impact of the attacks
    described in this RFC has been documented by the Internet
    Architecture Board (IAB) in [RFC4907].
 
 2.3.  Handling of ICMP Error Messages in the Context of IPsec
 
    Section 5.2 of [RFC4301] describes the processing of inbound IP
    traffic in the case of "unprotected-to-protected".  In the case of
    ICMP, when an unprotected ICMP error message is received, it is
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    matched to the corresponding security association by means of the SPI
    (Security Parameters Index) included in the payload of the ICMP error
    message.  Then, local policy is applied to determine whether to
    accept or reject the message and, if accepted, what action to take as
    a result.  For example, if an ICMP Destination Unreachable message is
    received, the implementation must decide whether to act on it, reject
    it, or act on it with constraints.  Section 8 ("Path MTU/DF
    Processing") discusses the processing of unauthenticated ICMPv4
    "fragmentation needed and DF bit set" (type 3, code 4) and ICMPv6
    "Packet Too Big" (type 2, code 0) messages when an IPsec
    implementation is configured to process (vs. ignore) such messages.
 
    Section 6.1.1 of [RFC4301] notes that processing of unauthenticated
    ICMP error messages may result in denial or degradation of service,
    and therefore it would be desirable to ignore such messages.
    However, it also notes that in many cases, ignoring these ICMP
    messages can degrade service, e.g., because of a failure to process
    PMTUD and redirection messages, and therefore there is also a
    motivation for accepting and acting upon them.  It finally states
    that to accommodate both ends of this spectrum, a compliant IPsec
    implementation MUST permit a local administrator to configure an
    IPsec implementation to accept or reject unauthenticated ICMP
    traffic, and that this control MUST be at the granularity of ICMP
    type and MAY be at the granularity of ICMP type and code.
    Additionally, an implementation SHOULD incorporate mechanisms and
    parameters for dealing with such traffic.
 
    Thus, the policy to apply for the processing of unprotected ICMP
    error messages is left up to the implementation and administrator.
 
 3.  Constraints in the Possible Solutions
 
    If a host wants to perform validation checks on the received ICMP
    error messages before acting on them, it is limited by the piece of
    the packet that triggered the error that the sender of the ICMP error
    message chose to include in the ICMP payload.  This constrains the
    possible validation checks, as the number of bytes of the packet that
    triggered the error message that is included in the ICMP payload is
    limited.
 
    For ICMPv4, [RFC0792] states that the IP header plus the first
    64 bits of the packet that triggered the ICMPv4 message are to be
    included in the payload of the ICMPv4 error message.  Thus, it is
    assumed that all data needed to identify a transport protocol
    instance and process the ICMPv4 error message is contained in the
    first 64 bits of the transport protocol header.  Section 3.2.2 of
    [RFC1122] states that "the Internet header and at least the first 8
    data octets of the datagram that triggered the error" are to be
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    included in the payload of ICMPv4 error messages, and that "more than
    8 octets MAY be sent", thus allowing implementations to include more
    data from the original packet than those required by the original
    ICMPv4 specification.  The "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers"
    RFC [RFC1812] states that ICMPv4 error messages "SHOULD contain as
    much of the original datagram as possible without the length of the
    ICMP datagram exceeding 576 bytes".
 
    Thus, for ICMPv4 messages generated by hosts, we can only expect to
    get the entire IP header of the original packet, plus the first
    64 bits of its payload.  For TCP, this means that the only fields
    that will be included in the ICMPv4 payload are the source port
    number, the destination port number, and the 32-bit TCP sequence
    number.  This clearly imposes a constraint on the possible validation
    checks that can be performed, as there is not much information
    available on which to perform them.
 
    This means, for example, that even if TCP were signing its segments
    by means of the TCP MD5 signature option [RFC2385], this mechanism
    could not be used as a counter-measure against ICMP-based attacks,
    because, as ICMP messages include only a piece of the TCP segment
    that triggered the error, the MD5 [RFC1321] signature could not be
    recalculated.  In the same way, even if the attacked peer were
    authenticating its packets at the IP layer [RFC4301], because only a
    part of the original IP packet would be available, the signature used
    for authentication could not be recalculated, and thus the
    authentication header in the original packet could not be used as a
    counter-measure for ICMP-based attacks against TCP.
 
    [RFC4884] updated [RFC0792] and specified that ICMPv4 Destination
    Unreachable (type 3), Time Exceeded (type 11), and Parameter Problem
    (type 12) messages that have an ICMP Extension Structure appended
    include at least 128 octets in the "original datagram" field.  This
    would improve the situation, but at the time of this writing,
    [RFC4884] is not yet widely deployed for end-systems.
 
    For IPv6, the payload of ICMPv6 error messages includes as many
    octets from the IPv6 packet that triggered the ICMPv6 error message
    as will fit without making the resulting ICMPv6 error message exceed
    the minimum IPv6 MTU (1280 octets) [RFC4443].  Thus, more information
    is available than in the IPv4 case.
 
    Hosts could require ICMP error messages to be authenticated
    [RFC4301], in order to act upon them.  However, while this
    requirement could make sense for those ICMP error messages sent by
    hosts, it would not be feasible for those ICMP error messages
    generated by routers, as this would imply either that the attacked
    system should have a security association [RFC4301] with every
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    existing intermediate system, or that it should be able to establish
    one dynamically.  Current levels of deployment of protocols for
    dynamic establishment of security associations makes this unfeasible.
    Additionally, this would require routers to use certificates with
    paths compatible for all hosts on the network.  Finally, there may be
    some scenarios, such as embedded devices, in which the processing
    power requirements of authentication might not allow IPsec
    authentication to be implemented effectively.
 
 4.  General Counter-Measures against ICMP Attacks
 
    The following subsections describe a number of mitigation techniques
    that help to eliminate or mitigate the impact of the attacks
    discussed in this document.  Rather than being alternative counter-
    measures, they can be implemented together to increase the protection
    against these attacks.
 
 4.1.  TCP Sequence Number Checking
 
    The current specifications do not impose any validity checks on the
    TCP segment that is contained in the ICMP payload.  For instance, no
    checks are performed to verify that a received ICMP error message has
    been triggered by a segment that was "in flight" to the destination.
    Thus, even stale ICMP error messages will be acted upon.
 
    Many TCP implementations have incorporated a validation check such
    that they react only to those ICMP error messages that appear to
    relate to segments currently "in flight" to the destination system.
    These implementations check that the TCP sequence number contained in
    the payload of the ICMP error message is within the range
    SND.UNA =< SEG.SEQ < SND.NXT.  This means that they require that the
    sequence number be within the range of the data already sent but not
    yet acknowledged.  If an ICMP error message does not pass this check,
    it is discarded.
 
    Even if an attacker were able to guess the four-tuple that identifies
    the TCP connection, this additional check would reduce the
    possibility of considering a spoofed ICMP packet as valid to
    Flight_Size/2^^32 (where Flight_Size is the number of data bytes
    already sent to the remote peer, but not yet acknowledged [RFC5681]).
    For connections in the SYN-SENT or SYN-RECEIVED states, this would
    reduce the possibility of considering a spoofed ICMP packet as valid
    to 1/2^^32.  For a TCP endpoint with no data "in flight", this would
    completely eliminate the possibility of success of these attacks.
 
    This validation check has been implemented in Linux [Linux] for many
    years, in OpenBSD [OpenBSD] since 2004, and in FreeBSD [FreeBSD] and
    NetBSD [NetBSD] since 2005.
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    It is important to note that while this check greatly increases the
    number of packets required to perform any of the attacks discussed in
    this document, this may not be enough in those scenarios in which
    bandwidth is easily available and/or large TCP windows [RFC1323] are
    in use.  Additionally, this validation check does not help to prevent
    on-path attacks, that is, attacks performed in scenarios in which the
    attacker can sniff the packets that correspond to the target TCP
    connection.
 
    It should be noted that, as there are no timeliness requirements for
    ICMP error messages, the TCP Sequence Number check described in this
    section might cause legitimate ICMP error messages to be discarded.
    Also, even if this check is enforced, TCP might end up responding to
    stale ICMP error messages (e.g., if the Sequence Number for the
    corresponding direction of the data transfer wraps around).
 
 4.2.  Port Randomization
 
    As discussed in the previous sections, in order to perform any of the
    attacks described in this document, an attacker would need to guess
    (or know) the four-tuple that identifies the connection to be
    attacked.  Increasing the port number range used for outgoing TCP
    connections, and randomizing the port number chosen for each outgoing
    TCP connection, would make it harder for an attacker to perform any
    of the attacks discussed in this document.
 
    [PORT-RANDOM] recommends that transport protocols randomize the
    ephemeral ports used by clients, and proposes a number of
    randomization algorithms.
 
 4.3.  Filtering ICMP Error Messages Based on the ICMP Payload
 
    The source address of ICMP error messages does not need to be spoofed
    to perform the attacks described in this document, as the ICMP error
    messages might legitimately come from an intermediate system.
    Therefore, simple filtering based on the source address of ICMP error
    messages does not serve as a counter-measure against these attacks.
    However, a more advanced packet filtering can be implemented in
    middlebox devices such as firewalls and NATs.  Middleboxes
    implementing such advanced filtering look at the payload of the ICMP
    error messages, and perform ingress and egress packet filtering based
    on the source address of the IP header contained in the payload of
    the ICMP error message.  As the source address contained in the
    payload of the ICMP error message does need to be spoofed to perform
    the attacks described in this document, this kind of advanced
    filtering serves as a counter-measure against these attacks.  As with
    traditional egress filtering [IP-filtering], egress filtering based
    on the ICMP payload can help to prevent users of the network being
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    protected by the firewall from successfully performing ICMP attacks
    against TCP connections established between external systems.
    Additionally, ingress filtering based on the ICMP payload can prevent
    TCP connections established between internal systems from being
    attacked by external systems.  [ICMP-Filtering] provides examples of
    ICMP filtering based on the ICMP payload.
 
    This filtering technique has been implemented in OpenBSD’s Packet
    Filter [OpenBSD-PF], which has in turn been ported to a number of
    systems, including FreeBSD [FreeBSD].
 
 5.  Blind Connection-Reset Attack
 
 5.1.  Description
 
    When TCP is handed an ICMP error message, it will perform its fault
    recovery function, as follows:
 
    o  If the network problem being reported is a "hard error", TCP will
       abort the corresponding connection.
 
    o  If the network problem being reported is a "soft error", TCP will
       just record this information, and repeatedly retransmit its data
       until they either get acknowledged, or the connection times out.
 
    The Host Requirements RFC [RFC1122] states (in Section 4.2.3.9) that
    a host SHOULD abort the corresponding connection when receiving an
    ICMPv4 error message that indicates a "hard error", and states that
    ICMPv4 error messages of type 3 (Destination Unreachable), codes 2
    (protocol unreachable), 3 (port unreachable), and 4 (fragmentation
    needed and DF bit set) should be considered as indicating "hard
    errors".  In the case of ICMPv4 port unreachables, the specifications
    are ambiguous, as Section 4.2.3.9 of [RFC1122] states that TCP SHOULD
    abort the corresponding connection in response to them, but
    Section 3.2.2.1 of the same RFC ([RFC1122]) states that TCP MUST
    abort the connection in response to them.
 
    While [RFC4443] did not exist when [RFC1122] was published, one could
    extrapolate the concept of "hard errors" to ICMPv6 error messages of
    type 1 (Destination Unreachable), codes 1 (communication with
    destination administratively prohibited), and 4 (port unreachable).
 
    Thus, an attacker could use ICMP to perform a blind connection-reset
    attack by sending any ICMP error message that indicates a "hard
    error" to either of the two TCP endpoints of the connection.  Because
    of TCP’s fault recovery policy, the connection would be immediately
    aborted.
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    Some stacks are known to extrapolate ICMP "hard errors" across TCP
    connections, increasing the impact of this attack, as a single ICMP
    packet could bring down all the TCP connections between the
    corresponding peers.
 
    It is important to note that even if TCP itself were protected
    against the blind connection-reset attack described in [Watson] and
    [TCPM-TCPSECURE] by means of authentication at the network layer
    [RFC4301], by means of the TCP MD5 signature option [RFC2385], by
    means of the TCP-AO [RFC5925], or by means of the mechanism specified
    in [TCPM-TCPSECURE], the blind connection-reset attack described in
    this document would still succeed.
 
 5.2.  Attack-Specific Counter-Measures
 
    An analysis of the circumstances in which ICMP messages that indicate
    "hard errors" may be received can shed some light on opportunities to
    mitigate the impact of ICMP-based blind connection-reset attacks.
 
    ICMPv4 type 3 (Destination Unreachable), code 2 (protocol
       unreachable)
 
       This ICMP error message indicates that the host sending the ICMP
       error message received a packet meant for a transport protocol it
       does not support.  For connection-oriented protocols such as TCP,
       one could expect to receive such an error as the result of a
       connection-establishment attempt.  However, it would be strange to
       get such an error during the life of a connection, as this would
       indicate that support for that transport protocol has been removed
       from the system sending the error message during the life of the
       corresponding connection.
 
    ICMPv4 type 3 (Destination Unreachable), code 3 (port unreachable)
 
       This error message indicates that the system sending the ICMP
       error message received a packet meant for a socket (IP address,
       port number) on which there is no process listening.  Those
       transport protocols that have their own mechanisms for signaling
       this condition should not be receiving these error messages, as
       the protocol would signal the port unreachable condition by means
       of its own mechanisms.  Assuming that once a connection is
       established it is not usual for the transport protocol to change
       (or be reloaded), it should be unusual to get these error
       messages.
 
    ICMPv4 type 3 (Destination Unreachable), code 4 (fragmentation needed
       and DF bit set)
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       This error message indicates that an intermediate node needed to
       fragment a datagram, but the DF (Don’t Fragment) bit in the IP
       header was set.  It is considered a "soft error" when TCP
       implements PMTUD, and a "hard error" if TCP does not implement
       PMTUD.  Those TCP/IP stacks that do not implement PMTUD (or have
       disabled it) but support IP fragmentation/reassembly should not be
       sending their IP packets with the DF bit set, and thus should not
       be receiving these ICMP error messages.  Some TCP/IP stacks that
       do not implement PMTUD and that do not support IP fragmentation/
       reassembly are known to send their packets with the DF bit set,
       and thus could legitimately receive these ICMP error messages.
 
    ICMPv6 type 1 (Destination Unreachable), code 1 (communication with
       destination administratively prohibited)
 
       This error message indicates that the destination is unreachable
       because of an administrative policy.  For connection-oriented
       protocols such as TCP, one could expect to receive such an error
       as the result of a connection-establishment attempt.  Receiving
       such an error for a connection in any of the synchronized states
       would mean that the administrative policy changed during the life
       of the connection.  However, in the same way this error condition
       (which was not present when the connection was established)
       appeared, it could get solved in the near term.
 
    ICMPv6 type 1 (Destination Unreachable), code 4 (port unreachable)
 
       This error message is analogous to the ICMPv4 type 3 (Destination
       Unreachable), code 3 (port unreachable) error message discussed
       above.  Therefore, the same considerations apply.
 
    The Host Requirements RFC [RFC1122] states in Section 4.2.3.9 that
    TCP SHOULD abort the corresponding connection in response to ICMPv4
    messages of type 3 (Destination Unreachable), codes 2 (protocol
    unreachable), 3 (port unreachable), and 4 (fragmentation needed and
    DF bit set).  However, Section 3.2.2.1 states that TCP MUST accept an
    ICMPv4 port unreachable (type 3, code 3) for the same purpose as a
    RST.  Therefore, for ICMPv4 messages of type 3, codes 2 and 4, there
    is room to go against the advice provided in the existing
    specifications, while in the case of ICMPv4 messages of type 3,
    code 3, there is ambiguity in the specifications that may or may not
    provide some room to go against that advice.
 
    Based on this analysis, most popular TCP implementations treat all
    ICMP "hard errors" received for connections in any of the
    synchronized states (ESTABLISHED, FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT,
    CLOSING, LAST-ACK, or TIME-WAIT) as "soft errors".  That is, they do
    not abort the corresponding connection upon receipt of them.
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    Additionally, they do not extrapolate ICMP errors across TCP
    connections.  This policy is based on the premise that TCP should be
    as robust as possible.  Aborting the connection would be to ignore
    the valuable feature of the Internet -- that for many internal
    failures, it reconstructs its function without any disruption of the
    endpoints [RFC0816].
 
    It should be noted that treating ICMP "hard errors" as "soft errors"
    for connections in any of the synchronized states may prevent TCP
    from responding quickly to a legitimate ICMP error message.
 
    It is interesting to note that, as ICMP error messages are
    transmitted unreliably, transport protocols should not depend on them
    for correct functioning.  In the event one of these messages were
    legitimate, the corresponding connection would eventually time out.
    Also, applications may still be notified asynchronously about the
    error condition, and thus may still abort their connections on their
    own if they consider it appropriate.
 
    In scenarios such as that in which an intermediate system sets the DF
    bit in the segments transmitted by a TCP that does not implement
    PMTUD, or the TCP at one of the endpoints of the connection is
    dynamically disabled, TCP would only abort the connection after a
    USER TIMEOUT [RFC0793], losing responsiveness.  However, these
    scenarios are very unlikely in production environments, and it is
    probably preferable to potentially lose responsiveness for the sake
    of robustness.  It should also be noted that applications may still
    be notified asynchronously about the error condition, and thus may
    still abort their connections on their own if they consider it
    appropriate.
 
    In scenarios of multipath routing or route changes, failures in some
    (but not all) of the paths may elicit ICMP error messages that would
    likely not cause a connection abort if any of the counter-measures
    described in this section were implemented.  However, aborting the
    connection would be to ignore the valuable feature of the Internet --
    that for many internal failures, it reconstructs its function without
    any disruption of the endpoints [RFC0816].  That is, communication
    should survive if there is still a working path to the destination
    system [DClark].  Additionally, applications may still be notified
    asynchronously about the error condition, and thus may still abort
    their connections on their own if they consider it appropriate.
 
    This counter-measure has been implemented in BSD-derived TCP/IP
    implementations (e.g., [FreeBSD], [NetBSD], and [OpenBSD]) for more
    than ten years [Wright][McKusick].  The Linux kernel has also
    implemented this policy for more than ten years [Linux].
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 6.  Blind Throughput-Reduction Attack
 
 6.1.  Description
 
    The Host Requirements RFC [RFC1122] states in Section 4.2.3.9 that
    hosts MUST react to ICMPv4 Source Quench messages by slowing
    transmission on the connection.  Thus, an attacker could send ICMPv4
    Source Quench (type 4, code 0) messages to a TCP endpoint to make it
    reduce the rate at which it sends data to the other endpoint of the
    connection.  [RFC1122] further adds that the RECOMMENDED procedure is
    to put the corresponding connection in the slow-start phase of TCP’s
    congestion control algorithm [RFC5681].  In the case of those
    implementations that use an initial congestion window of one segment,
    a sustained attack would reduce the throughput of the attacked
    connection to about SMSS (Sender Maximum Segment Size) [RFC5681]
    bytes per RTT (round-trip time).  The throughput achieved during an
    attack might be a little higher if a larger initial congestion window
    is in use [RFC3390].
 
 6.2.  Attack-Specific Counter-Measures
 
    As discussed in the "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers" RFC
    [RFC1812], research seems to suggest that ICMPv4 Source Quench
    messages are an ineffective (and unfair) antidote for congestion.
    [RFC1812] further states that routers SHOULD NOT send ICMPv4 Source
    Quench messages in response to congestion.  Furthermore, TCP
    implements its own congestion control mechanisms ([RFC5681]
    [RFC3168]) that do not depend on ICMPv4 Source Quench messages.
 
    Based on this reasoning, a large number of implementations completely
    ignore ICMPv4 Source Quench messages meant for TCP connections.  This
    behavior has been implemented in, at least, Linux [Linux] since 2004,
    and in FreeBSD [FreeBSD], NetBSD [NetBSD], and OpenBSD [OpenBSD]
    since 2005.  However, it must be noted that this behavior violates
    the requirement in [RFC1122] to react to ICMPv4 Source Quench
    messages by slowing transmission on the connection.
 
 7.  Blind Performance-Degrading Attack
 
 7.1.  Description
 
    When one IP system has a large amount of data to send to another
    system, the data will be transmitted as a series of IP datagrams.  It
    is usually preferable that these datagrams be of the largest size
    that does not require fragmentation anywhere along the path from the
    source to the destination.  This datagram size is referred to as the
    Path MTU (PMTU) and is equal to the minimum of the MTUs of each hop
    in the path.  A technique called "Path MTU Discovery" (PMTUD) lets IP
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    systems determine the Path MTU of an arbitrary internet path.
    [RFC1191] and [RFC1981] specify the PMTUD mechanism for IPv4 and
    IPv6, respectively.
 
    The PMTUD mechanism for IPv4 uses the Don’t Fragment (DF) bit in the
    IP header to dynamically discover the Path MTU.  The basic idea
    behind the PMTUD mechanism is that a source system assumes that the
    MTU of the path is that of the first hop, and sends all its datagrams
    with the DF bit set.  If any of the datagrams is too large to be
    forwarded without fragmentation by some intermediate router, the
    router will discard the corresponding datagram and will return an
    ICMPv4 "Destination Unreachable, fragmentation needed and DF set"
    (type 3, code 4) error message to the sending system.  This message
    will report the MTU of the constricting hop, so that the sending
    system can reduce the assumed Path-MTU accordingly.
 
    For IPv6, intermediate systems do not fragment packets.  Thus,
    there’s an "implicit" DF bit set in every packet sent on a network.
    If any of the datagrams is too large to be forwarded without
    fragmentation by some intermediate router, the router will discard
    the corresponding datagram, and will return an ICMPv6 "Packet Too
    Big" (type 2, code 0) error message to the sending system.  This
    message will report the MTU of the constricting hop, so that the
    sending system can reduce the assumed Path-MTU accordingly.
 
    As discussed in both [RFC1191] and [RFC1981], the Path-MTU Discovery
    mechanism can be used to attack TCP.  An attacker could send a
    crafted ICMPv4 "Destination Unreachable, fragmentation needed and DF
    set" packet (or their ICMPv6 counterpart) to the sending system,
    advertising a small Next-Hop MTU.  As a result, the attacked system
    would reduce the size of the packets it sends for the corresponding
    connection accordingly.
 
    The effect of this attack is two-fold.  On one hand, it will increase
    the headers/data ratio, thus increasing the overhead needed to send
    data to the remote TCP endpoint.  On the other hand, if the attacked
    system wanted to keep the same throughput it was achieving before
    being attacked, it would have to increase the packet rate.  On
    virtually all systems, this will lead to an increased processing
    overhead, thus degrading the overall system performance.
 
    A particular scenario that may take place is one in which an attacker
    reports a Next-Hop MTU smaller than or equal to the amount of bytes
    needed for headers (IP header, plus TCP header).  For example, if the
    attacker reports a Next-Hop MTU of 68 bytes, and the amount of bytes
    used for headers (IP header, plus TCP header) is larger than
    68 bytes, the assumed Path-MTU will not even allow the attacked
    system to send a single byte of application data without
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    fragmentation.  This particular scenario might lead to unpredictable
    results.  Another possible scenario is one in which a TCP connection
    is being secured by means of IPsec.  If the Next-Hop MTU reported by
    the attacker is smaller than the amount of bytes needed for headers
    (IP and IPsec, in this case), the assumed Path-MTU will not even
    allow the attacked system to send a single byte of the TCP header
    without fragmentation.  This is another scenario that may lead to
    unpredictable results.
 
    For IPv4, the reported Next-Hop MTU could be as small as 68 octets,
    as [RFC0791] requires every internet module to be able to forward a
    datagram of 68 octets without further fragmentation.  For IPv6, while
    the required minimum IPv6 MTU is 1280, the reported Next-Hop MTU can
    be smaller than 1280 octets [RFC2460].  If the reported Next-Hop MTU
    is smaller than the minimum IPv6 MTU, the receiving host is not
    required to reduce the Path-MTU to a value smaller than 1280, but is
    required to include a fragmentation header in the outgoing packets to
    that destination from that moment on.
 
 7.2.  Attack-Specific Counter-Measures
 
    The IETF has standardized a Path-MTU Discovery mechanism called
    "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery" (PLPMTUD) that does not
    depend on ICMP error messages.  Implementation of the aforementioned
    mechanism in replacement of the traditional PMTUD (specified in
    [RFC1191] and [RFC1981]) eliminates this vulnerability.  However, it
    can also lead to an increase in PMTUD convergence time.
 
    This section describes a modification to the PMTUD mechanism
    specified in [RFC1191] and [RFC1981] that has been incorporated in
    OpenBSD and NetBSD (since 2005) to improve TCP’s resistance to the
    blind performance-degrading attack described in Section 7.1.  The
    described counter-measure basically disregards ICMP messages when a
    connection makes progress, without violating any of the requirements
    stated in [RFC1191] and [RFC1981].
 
    Henceforth, we will refer to both ICMPv4 "fragmentation needed and DF
    bit set" and ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" messages as "ICMP Packet Too
    Big" messages.
 
    In addition to the general validation check described in Section 4.1,
    these implementations include a modification to TCP’s reaction to
    ICMP "Packet Too Big" error messages that disregards them when a
    connection makes progress, and honors them only after the
    corresponding data have been retransmitted a specified number of
    times.  This means that upon receipt of an ICMP "Packet Too Big"
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    error message, TCP just records this information, and honors it only
    when the corresponding data have already been retransmitted a
    specified number of times.
 
    While this basic policy would greatly mitigate the impact of the
    attack against the PMTUD mechanism, it would also mean that it might
    take TCP more time to discover the Path-MTU for a TCP connection.
    This would be particularly annoying for connections that have just
    been established, as it might take TCP several transmission attempts
    (and the corresponding timeouts) before it discovers the PMTU for the
    corresponding connection.  Thus, this policy would increase the time
    it takes for data to begin to be received at the destination host.
 
    In order to protect TCP from the attack against the PMTUD mechanism,
    while still allowing TCP to quickly determine the initial Path-MTU
    for a connection, the aforementioned implementations have divided the
    traditional PMTUD mechanism into two stages: Initial Path-MTU
    Discovery and Path-MTU Update.
 
    The Initial Path-MTU Discovery stage is when TCP tries to send
    segments that are larger than the ones that have so far been sent and
    acknowledged for this connection.  That is, in the Initial Path-MTU
    Discovery stage, TCP has no record of these large segments getting to
    the destination host, and thus these implementations believe the
    network when it reports that these packets are too large to reach the
    destination host without being fragmented.
 
    The Path-MTU Update stage is when TCP tries to send segments that are
    equal to or smaller than the ones that have already been sent and
    acknowledged for this connection.  During the Path-MTU Update stage,
    TCP already has knowledge of the estimated Path-MTU for the given
    connection.  Thus, in this case, these implementations are more
    cautious with the errors being reported by the network.
 
    In order to allow TCP to distinguish segments between those
    performing Initial Path-MTU Discovery and those performing Path-MTU
    Update, two new variables are introduced to TCP: maxsizesent and
    maxsizeacked.
 
    The maxsizesent variable holds the size (in octets) of the largest
    packet that has so far been sent for this connection.  It is
    initialized to 68 (the minimum IPv4 MTU) when the underlying Internet
    Protocol is IPv4, and is initialized to 1280 (the minimum IPv6 MTU)
    when the underlying Internet Protocol is IPv6.  Whenever a packet
    larger than maxsizesent octets is sent, maxsizesent is set to that
    value.
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    On the other hand, maxsizeacked holds the size (in octets) of the
    largest packet (data, plus headers) that has so far been acknowledged
    for this connection.  It is initialized to 68 (the minimum IPv4 MTU)
    when the underlying Internet Protocol is IPv4, and is initialized to
    1280 (the minimum IPv6 MTU) when the underlying Internet Protocol is
    IPv6.  Whenever an acknowledgement for a packet larger than
    maxsizeacked octets is received, maxsizeacked is set to the size of
    that acknowledged packet.  Note that because of TCP’s cumulative
    acknowledgement, a single ACK may acknowledge the receipt of more
    than one packet.  When that happens, the algorithm may "incorrectly"
    assume it is in the "Path-MTU Update" stage, rather than the "Initial
    Path-MTU Discovery" stage (as described below).
 
    Upon receipt of an ICMP "Packet Too Big" error message, the Next-Hop
    MTU claimed by the ICMP message (henceforth "claimedmtu") is compared
    with maxsizesent.  If claimedmtu is larger than maxsizesent, then the
    ICMP error message is silently discarded.  The rationale for this is
    that the ICMP error message cannot be legitimate if it claims to have
    been triggered by a packet larger than the largest packet we have so
    far sent for this connection.
 
    If this check is passed, claimedmtu is compared with maxsizeacked.
    If claimedmtu is equal to or larger than maxsizeacked, TCP is
    supposed to be at the Initial Path-MTU Discovery stage, and thus the
    ICMP "Packet Too Big" error message is honored immediately.  That is,
    the assumed Path-MTU is updated according to the Next-Hop MTU claimed
    in the ICMP error message.  Also, maxsizesent is reset to the minimum
    MTU of the Internet Protocol in use (68 for IPv4, and 1280 for IPv6).
 
    On the other hand, if claimedmtu is smaller than maxsizeacked, TCP is
    supposed to be in the Path-MTU Update stage.  At this stage, these
    implementations are more cautious with the errors being reported by
    the network, and therefore just record the received error message,
    and delay the update of the assumed Path-MTU.
 
    To perform this delay, one new variable and one new parameter are
    introduced to TCP: nsegrto and MAXSEGRTO.  The nsegrto variable holds
    the number of times a specified segment has timed out.  It is
    initialized to zero, and is incremented by one every time the
    corresponding segment times out.  MAXSEGRTO specifies the number of
    times a given segment must time out before an ICMP "Packet Too Big"
    error message can be honored, and can be set, in principle, to any
    value greater than or equal to 0.
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    Thus, if nsegrto is greater than or equal to MAXSEGRTO, and there’s a
    pending ICMP "Packet Too Big" error message, the corresponding error
    message is processed.  At that point, maxsizeacked is set to
    claimedmtu, and maxsizesent is set to 68 (for IPv4) or 1280 (for
    IPv6).
 
    If, while there is a pending ICMP "Packet Too Big" error message, the
    TCP SEQ claimed by the pending message is acknowledged (i.e., an ACK
    that acknowledges that sequence number is received), then the
    "pending error" condition is cleared.
 
    The rationale behind performing this delayed processing of ICMP
    "Packet Too Big" messages is that if there is progress on the
    connection, the ICMP "Packet Too Big" errors must be a false claim.
    By checking for progress on the connection, rather than just for
    staleness of the received ICMP messages, TCP is protected from attack
    even if the offending ICMP messages are "in window", and as a
    corollary, is made more robust to spurious ICMP messages triggered
    by, for example, corrupted TCP segments.
 
    MAXSEGRTO can be set, in principle, to any value greater than or
    equal to 0.  Setting MAXSEGRTO to 0 would make TCP perform the
    traditional PMTUD mechanism defined in [RFC1191] and [RFC1981].  A
    MAXSEGRTO of 1 provides enough protection for most cases.  In any
    case, implementations are free to choose higher values for this
    constant.  MAXSEGRTO could be a function of the Next-Hop MTU claimed
    in the received ICMP "Packet Too Big" message.  That is, higher
    values for MAXSEGRTO could be imposed when the received ICMP "Packet
    Too Big" message claims a Next-Hop MTU that is smaller than some
    specified value.  Both OpenBSD and NetBSD set MAXSEGRTO to 1.
 
    In the event a higher level of protection is desired at the expense
    of a higher delay in the discovery of the Path-MTU, an implementation
    could consider TCP to always be in the Path-MTU Update stage, thus
    always delaying the update of the assumed Path-MTU.
 
    Section 7.3 shows this counter-measure in action.  Section 7.4 shows
    this counter-measure in pseudo-code.
 
    It is important to note that the mechanism described in this section
    is an improvement to the current Path-MTU discovery mechanism, to
    mitigate its security implications.  The current PMTUD mechanism, as
    specified by [RFC1191] and [RFC1981], still suffers from some
    functionality problems [RFC2923] that this document does not aim to
    address.  A mechanism that addresses those issues is described in
    [RFC4821].
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 7.3.  The Counter-Measure for the PMTUD Attack in Action
 
    This section illustrates the operation of the counter-measure for the
    ICMP attack against the PMTUD mechanism that has been implemented in
    OpenBSD and NetBSD.  It shows both how the fix protects TCP from
    being attacked and how the counter-measure works in normal scenarios.
    As discussed in Section 7.2, this section assumes the PMTUD-specific
    counter-measure is implemented in addition to the TCP sequence number
    checking described in Section 4.1.
 
    Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical scenario in which two hosts are
    connected by means of three intermediate routers.  It also shows the
    MTU of each hypothetical hop.  All the following subsections assume
    the network setup of this figure.
 
    Also, for simplicity’s sake, all subsections assume an IP header of
    20 octets and a TCP header of 20 octets.  Thus, for example, when the
    PMTU is assumed to be 1500 octets, TCP will send segments that
    contain, at most, 1460 octets of data.
 
    For simplicity’s sake, all the following subsections assume the TCP
    implementation at Host 1 (H1) has chosen a MAXSEGRTO of 1.
 
    +----+        +----+        +----+        +----+        +----+
    | H1 |--------| R1 |--------| R2 |--------| R3 |--------| H2 |
    +----+        +----+        +----+        +----+        +----+
          MTU=4464      MTU=2048      MTU=1500      MTU=4464
 
                       Figure 1: Hypothetical Scenario
 
 7.3.1.  Normal Operation for Bulk Transfers
 
    This subsection shows the counter-measure in normal operation, when a
    TCP connection is used for bulk transfers.  That is, it shows how the
    counter-measure works when there is no attack taking place and a TCP
    connection is used for transferring large amounts of data.  This
    section assumes that just after the connection is established, one of
    the TCP endpoints begins to transfer data in packets that are as
    large as possible.
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        Host 1                                       Host 2
 
    1.    -->            <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN>           -->
    2.    <--      <SEQ=X><ACK=101><CTL=SYN,ACK>      <--
    3.    -->       <SEQ=101><ACK=X+1><CTL=ACK>       -->
    4.    --> <SEQ=101><ACK=X+1><CTL=ACK><DATA=4424>  -->
    5.       <--- ICMP "Packet Too Big" MTU=2048, TCPseq#=101 <--- R1
    6.    --> <SEQ=101><ACK=X+1><CTL=ACK><DATA=2008>  -->
    7.       <--- ICMP "Packet Too Big" MTU=1500, TCPseq#=101 <--- R2
    8.    --> <SEQ=101><ACK=X+1><CTL=ACK><DATA=1460>  -->
    9.    <--      <SEQ=X+1><ACK=1561><CTL=ACK>       <--
 
                Figure 2: Normal Operation for Bulk Transfers
 
    The nsegrto variable is initialized to zero.  Both maxsizeacked and
    maxsizesent are initialized to the minimum MTU for the Internet
    Protocol being used (68 for IPv4, and 1280 for IPv6).
 
    In lines 1 to 3, the three-way handshake takes place, and the
    connection is established.  In line 4, H1 tries to send a full-sized
    TCP segment.  As described by [RFC1191] and [RFC1981], in this case,
    TCP will try to send a segment with 4424 bytes of data, which will
    result in an IP packet of 4464 octets.  Therefore, maxsizesent is set
    to 4464.  When the packet reaches R1, it elicits an ICMP "Packet Too
    Big" error message.
 
    In line 5, H1 receives the ICMP error message, which reports a Next-
    Hop MTU of 2048 octets.  After performing the TCP sequence number
    check described in Section 4.1, the Next-Hop MTU reported by the ICMP
    error message (claimedmtu) is compared with maxsizesent.  As it is
    smaller than maxsizesent, it passes the check, and thus is then
    compared with maxsizeacked.  As claimedmtu is larger than
    maxsizeacked, TCP assumes that the corresponding TCP segment was
    performing the Initial PMTU Discovery.  Therefore, the TCP at H1
    honors the ICMP message by updating the assumed Path-MTU.  The
    maxsizesent variable is reset to the minimum MTU of the Internet
    Protocol in use (68 for IPv4, and 1280 for IPv6).
 
    In line 6, the TCP at H1 sends a segment with 2008 bytes of data,
    which results in an IP packet of 2048 octets.  The maxsizesent
    variable is thus set to 2008 bytes.  When the packet reaches R2, it
    elicits an ICMP "Packet Too Big" error message.
 
    In line 7, H1 receives the ICMP error message, which reports a Next-
    Hop MTU of 1500 octets.  After performing the TCP sequence number
    check, the Next-Hop MTU reported by the ICMP error message
    (claimedmtu) is compared with maxsizesent.  As it is smaller than
    maxsizesent, it passes the check, and thus is then compared with
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    maxsizeacked.  As claimedmtu is larger than maxsizeacked, TCP assumes
    that the corresponding TCP segment was performing the Initial PMTU
    Discovery.  Therefore, the TCP at H1 honors the ICMP message by
    updating the assumed Path-MTU.  The maxsizesent variable is reset to
    the minimum MTU of the Internet Protocol in use.
 
    In line 8, the TCP at H1 sends a segment with 1460 bytes of data,
    which results in an IP packet of 1500 octets.  Thus, maxsizesent is
    set to 1500.  This packet reaches H2, where it elicits an
    acknowledgement (ACK) segment.
 
    In line 9, H1 finally gets the acknowledgement for the data segment.
    As the corresponding packet was larger than maxsizeacked, TCP updates
    maxsizeacked, setting it to 1500.  At this point, TCP has discovered
    the Path-MTU for this TCP connection.
 
 7.3.2.  Operation during Path-MTU Changes
 
    Let us suppose a TCP connection between H1 and H2 has already been
    established, and that the PMTU for the connection has already been
    discovered to be 1500.  At this point, both maxsizesent and
    maxsizeacked are equal to 1500, and nsegrto is equal to 0.  Suppose
    some time later the PMTU decreases to 1492.  For simplicity, let us
    suppose that the Path-MTU has decreased because the MTU of the link
    between R2 and R3 has decreased from 1500 to 1492.  Figure 3
    illustrates how the counter-measure would work in this scenario.
 
        Host 1                                       Host 2
 
    1.                   (Path-MTU decreases)
    2.    -->  <SEQ=100><ACK=X><CTL=ACK><DATA=1460>   -->
    3.       <--- ICMP "Packet Too Big" MTU=1492, TCPseq#=100 <--- R2
    4.                   (Segment times out)
    5.    -->  <SEQ=100><ACK=X><CTL=ACK><DATA=1452>   -->
    6.    <--        <SEQ=X><ACK=1552><CTL=ACK>       <--
 
                 Figure 3: Operation during Path-MTU Changes
 
    In line 1, the Path-MTU for this connection decreases from 1500 to
    1492.  In line 2, the TCP at H1, without being aware of the Path-MTU
    change, sends a 1500-byte packet to H2.  When the packet reaches R2,
    it elicits an ICMP "Packet Too Big" error message.
 
    In line 3, H1 receives the ICMP error message, which reports a Next-
    Hop MTU of 1492 octets.  After performing the TCP sequence number
    check, the Next-Hop MTU reported by the ICMP error message
    (claimedmtu) is compared with maxsizesent.  As claimedmtu is smaller
    than maxsizesent, it is then compared with maxsizeacked.  As
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    claimedmtu is smaller than maxsizeacked (full-sized packets were
    getting to the remote endpoint), this packet is assumed to be
    performing Path-MTU Update, and a "pending error" condition is
    recorded.
 
    In line 4, the segment times out.  Thus, nsegrto is incremented by 1.
    As nsegrto is greater than or equal to MAXSEGRTO, the assumed Path-
    MTU is updated.  The nsegrto variable is reset to 0, maxsizeacked is
    set to claimedmtu, and maxsizesent is set to the minimum MTU of the
    Internet Protocol in use.
 
    In line 5, H1 retransmits the data using the updated PMTU, and thus
    maxsizesent is set to 1492.  The resulting packet reaches H2, where
    it elicits an acknowledgement (ACK) segment.
 
    In line 6, H1 finally gets the acknowledgement for the data segment.
    At this point, TCP has discovered the new Path-MTU for this TCP
    connection.
 
 7.3.3.  Idle Connection Being Attacked
 
    Let us suppose a TCP connection between H1 and H2 has already been
    established, and the PMTU for the connection has already been
    discovered to be 1500.  Figure 4 shows a sample time-line diagram
    that illustrates an idle connection being attacked.
 
        Host 1                                       Host 2
 
    1.    -->   <SEQ=100><ACK=X><CTL=ACK><DATA=50>    -->
    2.    <--        <SEQ=X><ACK=150><CTL=ACK>        <--
    3.       <--- ICMP "Packet Too Big" MTU=68, TCPseq#=100 <---
    4.       <--- ICMP "Packet Too Big" MTU=68, TCPseq#=100 <---
    5.       <--- ICMP "Packet Too Big" MTU=68, TCPseq#=100 <---
 
                  Figure 4: Idle Connection Being Attacked
 
    In line 1, H1 sends its last bunch of data.  In line 2, H2
    acknowledges the receipt of these data.  Then the connection becomes
    idle.  In lines 3, 4, and 5, an attacker sends forged ICMP "Packet
    Too Big" error messages to H1.  Regardless of how many packets it
    sends and of the TCP sequence number each ICMP packet includes, none
    of these ICMP error messages will pass the TCP sequence number check
    described in Section 4.1, as H1 has no unacknowledged data "in
    flight" to H2.  Therefore, the attack does not succeed.
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 7.3.4.  Active Connection Being Attacked after Discovery of the Path-MTU
 
    Let us suppose an attacker attacks a TCP connection for which the
    PMTU has already been discovered.  In this case, as illustrated in
    Figure 1, the PMTU would be found to be 1500 bytes.  Figure 5 shows a
    possible packet exchange.
 
        Host 1                                       Host 2
 
    1.    -->  <SEQ=100><ACK=X><CTL=ACK><DATA=1460>   -->
    2.    -->  <SEQ=1560><ACK=X><CTL=ACK><DATA=1460>  -->
    3.    -->  <SEQ=3020><ACK=X><CTL=ACK><DATA=1460>  -->
    4.    -->  <SEQ=4480><ACK=X><CTL=ACK><DATA=1460>  -->
    5.       <--- ICMP "Packet Too Big" MTU=68, TCPseq#=100 <---
    6.    <--       <SEQ=X><CTL=ACK><ACK=1560>        <--
 
     Figure 5: Active Connection Being Attacked after Discovery of PMTU
 
    As we assume the PMTU has already been discovered, we also assume
    both maxsizesent and maxsizeacked are equal to 1500.  We assume
    nsegrto is equal to zero, as there have been no segment timeouts.
 
    In lines 1, 2, 3, and 4, H1 sends four data segments to H2.  In
    line 5, an attacker sends a forged ICMP error message to H1.  We
    assume the attacker is lucky enough to guess both the four-tuple that
    identifies the connection and a valid TCP sequence number.  As the
    Next-Hop MTU claimed in the ICMP "Packet Too Big" message
    (claimedmtu) is smaller than maxsizeacked, this packet is assumed to
    be performing Path-MTU Update.  Thus, the error message is recorded.
 
    In line 6, H1 receives an acknowledgement for the segment sent in
    line 1, before it times out.  At this point, the "pending error"
    condition is cleared, and the recorded ICMP "Packet Too Big" error
    message is ignored.  Therefore, the attack does not succeed.
 
 7.3.5.  TCP Peer Attacked when Sending Small Packets Just after the
         Three-Way Handshake
 
    This section analyzes a scenario in which a TCP peer that is sending
    small segments just after the connection has been established is
    attacked.  The connection could be in use by protocols such as SMTP
    [RFC5321] and HTTP [RFC2616], for example, which usually behave like
    this.
 
    Figure 6 shows a possible packet exchange for such a scenario.
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        Host 1                                       Host 2
 
    1.    -->           <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN>            -->
    2.    <--      <SEQ=X><ACK=101><CTL=SYN,ACK>      <--
    3.    -->       <SEQ=101><ACK=X+1><CTL=ACK>       -->
    4.    -->  <SEQ=101><ACK=X+1><CTL=ACK><DATA=100>  -->
    5.    <--       <SEQ=X+1><ACK=201><CTL=ACK>       <--
    6.    -->  <SEQ=201><ACK=X+1><CTL=ACK><DATA=100>  -->
    7.    -->  <SEQ=301><ACK=X+1><CTL=ACK><DATA=100>  -->
    8.       <--- ICMP "Packet Too Big" MTU=150, TCPseq#=201 <---
 
           Figure 6: TCP Peer Attacked when Sending Small Packets
                     Just after the Three-Way Handshake
 
    The nsegrto variable is initialized to zero.  Both maxsizesent and
    maxsizeacked are initialized to the minimum MTU for the Internet
    Protocol being used (68 for IPv4, and 1280 for IPv6).
 
    In lines 1 to 3, the three-way handshake takes place, and the
    connection is established.  At this point, the assumed Path-MTU for
    this connection is 4464.  In line 4, H1 sends a small segment (which
    results in a 140-byte packet) to H2.  Therefore, maxsizesent is set
    to 140.  In line 5, this segment is acknowledged, and thus
    maxsizeacked is set to 140.
 
    In lines 6 and 7, H1 sends two small segments to H2.  In line 8,
    while the segments from lines 6 and 7 are still "in flight" to H2, an
    attacker sends a forged ICMP "Packet Too Big" error message to H1.
    Assuming the attacker is lucky enough to guess a valid TCP sequence
    number, this ICMP message will pass the TCP sequence number check.
    The Next-Hop MTU reported by the ICMP error message (claimedmtu) is
    then compared with maxsizesent.  As claimedmtu is larger than
    maxsizesent, the ICMP error message is silently discarded.
    Therefore, the attack does not succeed.
 
 7.4.  Pseudo-Code for the Counter-Measure for the Blind Performance-
       Degrading Attack
 
    This section contains a pseudo-code version of the counter-measure
    described in Section 7.2 for the blind performance-degrading attack
    described in Section 7.  It is meant as guidance for developers on
    how to implement this counter-measure.
 
    The pseudo-code makes use of the following variables, constants, and
    functions:
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    ack
       Variable holding the acknowledgement number contained in the TCP
       segment that has just been received.
 
    acked_packet_size
       Variable holding the packet size (data, plus headers) that the ACK
       that has just been received is acknowledging.
 
    adjust_mtu()
       Function that adjusts the MTU for this connection, according to
       the ICMP "Packet Too Big" that was last received.
 
    claimedmtu
       Variable holding the Next-Hop MTU advertised by the ICMP "Packet
       Too Big" error message.
 
    claimedtcpseq
       Variable holding the TCP sequence number contained in the payload
       of the ICMP "Packet Too Big" message that has just been received
       or was last recorded.
 
    current_mtu
       Variable holding the assumed Path-MTU for this connection.
 
    drop_message()
       Function that performs the necessary actions to drop the ICMP
       message being processed.
 
    initial_mtu
       Variable holding the MTU for new connections, as explained in
       [RFC1191] and [RFC1981].
 
    maxsizeacked
       Variable holding the largest packet size (data, plus headers) that
       has so far been acked for this connection, as explained in
       Section 7.2.
 
    maxsizesent
       Variable holding the largest packet size (data, plus headers) that
       has so far been sent for this connection, as explained in
       Section 7.2.
 
    nsegrto
       Variable holding the number of times this segment has timed out,
       as explained in Section 7.2.
 
    packet_size
       Variable holding the size of the IP datagram being sent.
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    pending_message
       Variable (flag) that indicates whether there is a pending ICMP
       "Packet Too Big" message to be processed.
 
    save_message()
       Function that records the ICMP "Packet Too Big" message that has
       just been received.
 
    MINIMUM_MTU
       Constant holding the minimum MTU for the Internet Protocol in use
       (68 for IPv4, and 1280 for IPv6).
 
    MAXSEGRTO
       Constant holding the number of times a given segment must time out
       before an ICMP "Packet Too Big" error message can be honored.
 
 
    EVENT: New TCP connection
 
     current_mtu = initial_mtu;
     maxsizesent = MINIMUM_MTU;
     maxsizeacked = MINIMUM_MTU;
     nsegrto = 0;
     pending_message = 0;
 
    EVENT: Segment is sent
 
     if (packet_size > maxsizesent)
          maxsizesent = packet_size;
 
    EVENT: Segment is received
 
     if (acked_packet_size > maxsizeacked)
          maxsizeacked = acked_packet_size;
 
     if (pending_message)
          if (ack > claimedtcpseq){
               pending_message = 0;
               nsegrto = 0;
          }
 
    EVENT: ICMP "Packet Too Big" message is received
 
     if (claimedmtu <= MINIMUM_MTU)
          drop_message();
 
     if (claimedtcpseq < SND.UNA || claimedtcpseq >= SND.NXT)
          drop_message();
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     else {
          if (claimedmtu > maxsizesent || claimedmtu >= current_mtu)
               drop_message();
 
          else {
               if (claimedmtu > maxsizeacked){
                    adjust_mtu();
                    current_mtu = claimedmtu;
                    maxsizesent = MINIMUM_MTU;
               }
 
               else {
                    pending_message = 1;
                    save_message();
               }
          }
     }
 
    EVENT: Segment times out
 
     nsegrto++;
 
     if (pending_message && nsegrto >= MAXSEGRTO){
          adjust_mtu();
          nsegrto = 0;
          pending_message = 0;
          maxsizeacked = claimedmtu;
          maxsizesent = MINIMUM_MTU;
          current_mtu = claimedmtu;
     }
 
    Notes:
       All comparisons between sequence numbers must be performed using
       sequence number arithmetic.
 
       The pseudo-code implements the mechanism described in Section 7.2,
       the TCP sequence number checking described in Section 4.1, and the
       validation check on the advertised Next-Hop MTU described in
       [RFC1191] and [RFC1981].
 
 8.  Security Considerations
 
    This document describes the use of ICMP error messages to perform a
    number of attacks against TCP, and describes a number of widely
    implemented counter-measures that either eliminate or reduce the
    impact of these attacks when they are performed by off-path
    attackers.
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    Section 4.1 describes a validation check that could be enforced on
    ICMP error messages, such that TCP reacts only to those ICMP error
    messages that appear to relate to segments currently "in flight" to
    the destination system.  This requires more effort on the side of an
    off-path attacker at the expense of possible reduced responsiveness
    to network errors.
 
    Section 4.2 describes how randomization of TCP ephemeral ports
    requires more effort on the side of the attacker to successfully
    exploit any of the attacks described in this document.
 
    Section 4.3 describes how ICMP error messages could possibly be
    filtered based on their payload, to prevent users of the local
    network from successfully performing attacks against third-party
    connections.  This is analogous to ingress filtering and egress
    filtering of IP packets [IP-filtering].
 
    Section 5.2 describes an attack-specific counter-measure for the
    blind connection-reset attack.  It describes the processing of ICMP
    "hard errors" as "soft errors" when they are received for connections
    in any of the synchronized states.  This counter-measure eliminates
    the aforementioned vulnerability in synchronized connections at the
    expense of possible reduced responsiveness in some network scenarios.
 
    Section 6.2 describes an attack-specific counter-measure for the
    blind throughput-reduction attack.  It suggests that the
    aforementioned vulnerability can be eliminated by ignoring ICMPv4
    Source Quench messages meant for TCP connections.  This is in
    accordance with research results that indicate that ICMPv4 Source
    Quench messages are ineffective and are an unfair antidote for
    congestion.
 
    Finally, Section 7.2 describes an attack-specific counter-measure for
    the blind performance-degrading attack.  It consists of the
    validation check described in Section 4.1, with a modification that
    makes TCP react to ICMP "Packet Too Big" error messages such that
    they are processed when an outstanding TCP segment times out.  This
    counter-measure parallels the Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery
    (PLPMTUD) mechanism [RFC4821].  It should be noted that if this
    counter-measure is implemented, in some scenarios TCP may respond
    more slowly to valid ICMP "Packet Too Big" error messages.
 
    A discussion of these and other attack vectors for performing similar
    attacks against TCP (along with possible counter-measures) can be
    found in [CPNI-TCP] and [TCP-SECURITY].
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